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          Bingham County Case No.  
          CR-2014-1861 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Evans failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, for possession of 
methamphetamine, or by relinquishing jurisdiction? 
 
 
Evans Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Evans pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and, in December 2014, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.114-17.)  After a period of retained jurisdiction the district 
court relinquished jurisdiction in April 2015.  (R., pp.128-29.)  In January 2016, Evans 
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filed a petition for post-conviction relief.  (Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part 
Respondent’s Motion For Summary Dismissal, p.1, n.1. (Augmentation).)  The district 
court granted relief and entered an amended judgment of conviction to allow Evans to 
file a notice of appeal.  (Order Granting Petitioner’s Petition For Post Conviction Relief, 
pp.1-2. (Augmentation).)  The district court also entered a first amended order 
relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.130-32.)  Evans filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., 
pp.133-35.)   
Evans asserts her sentence is excessive in light of her substance abuse issues 
and “traumatic head injury”.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  The record supports the 
sentences imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire 
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  Id.  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 
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368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  
Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily 
not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 
103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
The maximum prison sentence for possession of methamphetamine is seven 
years.  I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., 
pp.114-17.)  Evans has a long criminal history that includes felony convictions for 
robbery and failure to register as a violent offender; and misdemeanor convictions for 
petit theft, DUI, family member assault, and failure to purchase a driver’s license.  (PSI, 
pp.3-6.)  Also, while on pretrial release for the instant offense, Evans absconded 
supervision and was arrested in Utah before being extradited back to Idaho, and was 
then held in the Bingham County Jail where she was disciplined for fighting and 
disobeying orders.  (PSI, p.6.)   
In 2007, Evans violated her parole by absconding and failing to register as a 
violent offender, after which “she returned to prison for a year.”  (PSI, p.6.)  Following 
her incarceration, Evans received an interstate compact to Idaho, and while on parole in 
Idaho she was convicted of a DUI and a parole violation.  (PSI, p.6.)  Evans was 
thereafter “given the opportunity to participate in inpatient treatment but she walked 
away from treatment and absconded from supervision.”  (PSI, p.6.)  Evans’ interstate 
compact was revoked and she returned to Montana, where she was placed on intensive 
supervision.  (PSI, p.6.)  Evans’ history of parole violations and criminal conduct is not a 
direct result of her traumatic head injury, which occurred in February 2013, but appears 
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instead to be due to her repeated decisions to disregard the law.  (PSI, p.38.)  At 
sentencing, the district court set forth its reasons for imposing Evans’ sentence, 
including Evans’ issues with supervision, and her unwillingness to fully accept 
responsibility.  (Tr., p.36, L.25 – p.41, L.11.)  The state submits Evans has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt 
of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  
(Appendix A.)  
 “Mindful of the fact that she is currently on parole,” Evans nevertheless next 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, 
rather than grant her probation, in light of her traumatic brain injury.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.1, 7-8.)  The issue Evans raises is moot because, as Evans acknowledges, she is 
already on parole.   
“An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy 
that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.”  State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 
232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted).  Although the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction, and Evans was incarcerated, she has since been paroled.  
(Memorandum from the State of Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole, p.1. 
(Augmentation).)  Thus, even if this Court were to determine that the district court erred 
by relinquishing jurisdiction, such a determination would have no practical effect upon 
the outcome of the case because Evans is no longer incarcerated.  Evans’ claim is, 
therefore, moot and this Court must decline to consider it.   
Even if this Court considers Evans’ claim that the district court abused its 
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, the claim fails.  Evans’ actions while on her 
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rider, even if not the product of a “voluntary behavioral problem” (Appellant’s brief, p.8), 
show that she was not amenable to probation.  Rider staff succinctly summarized 
Evans’ performance during her brief stint in the retained jurisdiction program, as follows: 
Ms. Evans was briefly in TC beginning in January 2015.  Approximately 
two (2) weeks into programming, she violated a cardinal rule of the TC by 
threatening violence on another offender.  She was served with a DOR 
and was sent on a 30 day reflection period prior to being allowed to 
reenter the TC.  Upon returning to TC, Ms. Evans was only involved in 
programming for a weekend before she was involved in another 
confrontation with an orientation phase offender.  While this was 
determined not to be a cardinal rule violation, Ms. Evans stated she was 
not willing to talk to staff about her involvement and would instead sign a 
refusal to program.  Despite staff efforts to explain the repercussions of 
that decision, Ms. Evans did sign refusal papers and was removed from 
the TC. 
 
(APSI, p.6.)   
 Even assuming Evans’ inability or unwillingness to follow the rules of the rider 
program was due in part to her mental limitations, such does not show the district court 
abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.  If Evans could not comply with the 
rules in the “structured” environment of a rider, there is very little reason to believe she 
could comply with requirements of a supervised probation.  This is especially true give 
Evans’ past history of pretrial release and parole violations, discussed supra.  Given 
Evans’ abysmal performance in the TC program, the district court did not abuse its 










 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Evans’ conviction and 
sentence and dismiss Evans’ appeal from the district court’s order relinquishing 
jurisdiction because the issue she raises is moot. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming_______ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ALICIA HYMAS 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of August, 2017, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming_______ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General   
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